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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOANNE ADAMS LEISHMAN, 
dba SAMAK Lodge, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
KAMAS VALLEY LUMBER 
COMPANY, a Corporation 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
10711 
Counsel for appellant is not quite accurate in 
his statement of the facts, and so we shall briefly 
set out these facts: 
In the spring of 1964, Mrs. Joanne Leishman 
commenced reconstruction work on the Samak Lodge 
near Kamas, Utah. This lodge consisted of a restau-
:~ant, kitchen, lounge facilities and restrooms (TR 
·iJ. The structure had previously collapsed from the 
snows, and so she and a partner, Mr. Ben Dell, looked 
around for the type of wood beams that would hold 
2 
the roof structure on their proposed building. The'. 
had consulted with Hyland Lumber Company anri 
Morrison-Merrill Company in Salt Lake City con. 
cerning wood beams. They then contacted Kama' 
Valley Lumber Company about the problem, tol; · 
them and showed them a sketch of the type of rool 
structure they desired to use and that the previo11, 
roof in the building had failed and "we did not want 
that problem again." (TR 14). 
Mr. Bannister and Mr. Weaver of Kamas Val-
ley Lumber Company were familiar with the build-
ing and of its collapsed condition, and represente~ 1 
that they could supply the same type and qualitr 
beam as the Salt Lake supplier and that responden' ' 
could save freight and time. A sample laminateG :, 
beam was shown that appellant manufactured, am!! 
appellant further represented that respondent woulu; 
have no problem with the snow depth they wen i 
concerned about of up to four feet of snow with thr I 
use of their beams (TR 15). Respondent thereupo1: / 
ordered the laminated beams for use in the recon· :. 
struction of the Samak Lodge. 
A short time later, but before the delivery of tht 
beams, Mr. Weaver and Mr. Walt Carroll, who wa~ 
the man in charge of constructing the beams for· 
appellant company, came out to the job site when· 
they discussed the spacing of the beams as being 0" 
eight-foot centers, and Mr. Carroll said if "!ht .• 
would put a one-inch camber in the beams, that tha 
would be sufficient." (TR 16) 
The beams were then delivered with the o~e' 
inch camber and at the time of delivery of tn, 
beams, resp~ndent was concerned about their a: 
3 
pearance and contacted Mr. Weaver again about it. 
Mr. Weaver again assured respondent that the small 
gaps in the beams could be filled in, sanded down 
and painted, but that the beams were structurally 
sound. (TR 20, 21, 149). This was done by respond-
ent and the beams were used on the structure. 
Subsequently, respondent heard of someone else 
getting a better price on these type beams than they 
were paying, so a complaint was made to Mr. Weav-
er about it, and an adjustment in price was given 
(TR 39, 41, 152). 
The lodge construction was completed by re-
spondent and they operated as a going business for 
a few months. In the latter part of February, 1965, 
the beams gave way, the roof collapsed and partially 
destroyed the building. When respondent discovered 
this they promptly notified appellant of the failure 
of their beams, which the expert engineers who ex-
amined the beams and testified in this action said 
were defectively manufactured. 
Respondent had purchased the property orig-
inally for $7500.00. It cost her over $6500.00 in 
cash in the reconstruction of its former collapsed 
condition, and it would have cost about $11,500.00 
to restore the building to its condition just prior to 
the collapse of these defective beams. (TR 97). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THERE 
\\.A8 A WARRANTY FROM APPELLANT TO 
4 
RESPONDENT OF THE FITNESS FOR USE r
1
r 
THE BEAMS FOR THE PARTICULAR USE Ti 
WHICH THEY WERE PUT. 
60-1-15 (1) of Utah code annotated, 1953 statr 
as follows: 
"Where the buyer, expressly or by iv 
plication, makes known to the seller the pai · 
ticular purpose for which the goods are fr 1 
quired, and it appears that the buyer reliesn· 
the seller's skill or judgment (whether he 1. 
the grower or manufacturer or not), thm i. 
an implied warranty that the goods shall l1r 
reasonably fit for such purpose." 
60-1-12 of Utah code annotated, 1953, gives tn1 
definition of an express warranty: 
"Any affirmation of fact or any prornisr 
by the seller relative to the goods is an expm' 
warranty, if the natural tendency of sue! 
affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer 
to purchase the goods, and if the buyer pur 
chases the goods relying thereon.'' 
In the case at bar, we submit that there wa~. 
a warranty, both express and implied, that the bearn! I 
manufactured and sold by appellant to responden' 
were structurally sound and were suitable for tnt 
purpose for which they were purchased, and respona 
ent relied thereon. The evidence clearly sustains th!! 
position and the Court so found. I 
Mr. Ben Dell testified that in talking with ~!: 
Weaver of appellant's company: 
"The question arose as to the type of rori: 
structure we were going to use. I told him tha 
5 
we wanted to use a laminated beam because 
the previous roof in the building had failed, 
and we did not want that problem again. I told 
him I had talked to Hyland Lumber Com-
pany, got price on laminated beams and found 
that because of a strike from their supplier, 
they could not supply the beams for at least 
six weeks. Mr. Bannister or Mr. Weaver then 
told me that they made laminated beams, they 
could supply the same type and quality beam, 
and we would save freight from Salt Lake 
to Kamas, the price would be approximately 
the same." 
"During that conversation I asked him 
about the beams. He showed me a sample that 
he had in his office. At that time I asked him 
would that sample hold up to four feet of 
snow, because we don't want this roof to go 
in again. He left his office, went over to the 
... what I later found out was the sales coun-
ter, sales desk, referred to a book, came back 
and said, 'you would have no problem with 
that snow depth'". (TR 14, 15). 
These representations were relied upon by Re-
spondent (TR 15). 
Now Mr. Ben Dell, previous to the above con-
versation and representations, had shown appellant 
the diagram and sketch and dimensions of the build-
ing (TR 12, 37), thus they were familiar with it 
and its previous collapsed condition. 
Then after the construction work was started, 
but before delivery of the beams, representatives 
of Kamas Valley Lumber Company, Mr. Weaver and 
Mr. Walt Carroll (who was in charge of construct-
6 
ing the beams), came out to the job site, and Mi. 
Dell testified on this visit as follows: 
. "They looked. to see what span we wen 
going on. We discussed the spacing of the 
beams, that they were to be on eight-foot cen-
ters. At that time Mr. Carroll said that he 1 
would put a one-inch camber in the beams 
that that would be sufficient." (TR 16). '. 
Respondent followed the recommendation of get-
ting the beams with the one-inch camber (TR 18, 
19), and nothing was heard from Mr. Weaver or 
Mr. Carroll as to the spacing of the beams at less 
than the eight-foot centers (TR 16). 
Then again, at the time of the delivery of the 
beams to the job respondents were concerned abou1 
the appearance of the beams and they sought out . 
Mr. Weaver of appellant company for assurances, 
and once again respondent was told that "the beams• 
were structurally sound, they would do the job that · 
we wanted." Further, it was suggested by Mr. 
Weaver that bolts could be put through the beams if 
they were concerned, "but really we didn't need it be· , 
cause the beams were structurally sound" (TR 20). 1 
, I 
Then Mr. Weaver recommended that the gaps ll1 1 
the laminations and appearance of the beams coula · 
be corrected and cleared up by "filling in," sanding 
down and painting. Again this recommendation of 
appellant was followed by respondent (TR 20, 21, 
1 
148,149). I 
Mrs. Leishma.n also testified as to these c?nveri [ 
sations and especially as to the representat10n ° • 
appellant as to the structural quality of the beams. • 
(TR 119) 
7 
Counsel for appellant makes a point of the fact 
that the defectiveness and structural weaknesses of 
the beams were obvious to Mrs. Leishman and Mr. 
Dell. This is not the case, (TR 21, 118, 119). The 
evidence shows they were primarily concerned about 
the appearance of these exposed beams and they 
were satisfied with the assurances of the manufac-
turer as to the structural soundness. They were not 
engineers or experts in this field and they had to rely 
on the skill and judgment of the manufacturer here. 
Why would respondent spend several thousand dol-
lars in this building that had already once before 
collapsed from the snow and then knowingly put in 
defective beams on the new structure? This argu-
ment is ridiculous, and the lower court wisely would 
not buy it. 
Yes, there is ample evidence to support the 
court's finding of a warranty of fitness for use here. 
(See also Nielson v. Hermansen, 109 U. 180, 166 
P 2nd 536 and Nephi Processing Plant, Inc. v. Tal-
bott, 24 7 F 2nd 771. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT MAK-
ING A FINDING THAT BUYER FAILED TO 
GIVE NOTICE OF THE BREACH OF WARRAN-
TY. 
As was discussed under Point I, appellant con-
tinued to represent the structural soundness of their 
beams and that it would do the job intended and 
which they personally observed even after delivery of 
8 
said beams (TR 20, 21, 148, 149). Thus there wa' 
no knowledge of a breach of these representation, 
and warranties until the beams actually failed anu 
collapsed, and then it was that respondent gave due 
notice to appellant of the breach, and the court Si1 
found. . 
The code provision quoted by Counsel for ap. 
pellant, 60-3-9 of the Utah code annotated 195i, 
was only partially quoted. The applicable part of tha> 
law, and which holds for respondent's position is a~ 
follows: 
"In the absence of express or impllell 
agreement of the parties, acceptance of the 
goods by the buyer shall not discharge the 
seller from liability in damages, or other legal 
remedy for breach of any promise or war· 
ranty in the contract to sell or the sale." 
In our case the warranty of structural souml· 
ness was reiterated again by appellant to respondem 
after delivery, and acceptance was made based upon 
those assurances. 
POINT III 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING 
THAT APPELLANT REPRESENTED THEHI~ 
BEAMS SOLD WOULD STAND THE WEIG 1 
OF UP TO FOUR FEET OF SNOW. 
In answer to counsel's or appellant's statemen' 
in his brief that "nowhere in the record is there an1 
claim that defendant represented that the beam: 
would stand the weight of up to four feet of snow, 
9 
we merely ref er the court to our argument in Point 
I where the testimony is set out in detail on this 
question (TR 14, 15. See also (TR 29) where refer-
ence is made again to the subject.) 
The court therefore had very adequate testi-
mony and evidence as to this representation to sup-
port its finding. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING 
THAT PLAINTIFF RELIED UPON DEFEND-
ANT'S REPRESENTATION THAT THE BEAMS 
WERE FIT FOR THE USE FOR WHICH PLAIN-
TIFF PURCHASED THEM. 
It is true that both Mrs. Leishman and Mr. Dell 
were concerned about the snow problem in the 
Kamas area. This is one of the reasons they were 
relying on the skill and judgment of the manufac-
turer of the beams and that said beams would be 
suitable for their purpose in holding the roof on 
that particular building which had previously col-
lapsed and which appellant and their salesmen were 
entirely familiar with (TR 12, 15, 20, 37, 153). 
Mr. Weaver of appellant company himself testi-
fied that he was very familiar with Samak Lodge 
before the sale of said beams, and he knew the pur-
pose and use to be made of the beams by respondent, 
and he actually recommended their beam for this 
job. He further showed the sample of how it was 
manufactured, all for the purpose, of course, to sell 
respondent on its fitness for use in the job (TR 153, 
154, 155). 
10 
. Respondent thereupon bought the beams, reh 
mg upon appellant's recommendations. ·. 
Mr. Dell testified further in the conversatior 
with appellant as to the fitness of the beams fo 
the snow problem in the area as follows: 
Q. "Based upon - or did you thereupor 
order the beams?" 
A. "A week later" 
Q. "I ask you, Mr. Dell, if you relied up· 
on the conversations that had taken plare.'' 
A. "Yes, sir, I did." 
Q. "Did you communicate these conver· · 
sations to Mrs. Leishman?" ' 
A. "Yes". 
Q. "Did she authorize you to order thesf 
beams?" 
A. "Yes, Sir." 
It should be mentioned here that an adjustmeni 
in price on the beams was given because someont 
else had bought beams for less money in the area 
and no rebate was given because of defects in tht 
beams. Mr. Weaver himself, of appellant compan1 
stated (TR 152): 
11 
A. "He (Dell) came in and complained 
because someone else had bought the beams 
for less money." 
Q. "Was an adjustment made for that?" 
A. "I understood that that was made." 
Mr. Ben Dell's testimony was also clear on this 
point when he said (TR 29) : 
"One of the people living in the area came 
down, looked at the beams, told me that he had 
paid a dollar thirty four for the same type 
beam; and that is when I questioned Mr. 
Weaver as to why we were being charged one 
dollar eighty four when they had sold it for 
one dollar thirty four to somebody else." 
As to the question of Mr. Weaver suggesting 
bolts in the beams, the fact that respondent didn't 
do it, (TR 39) shows even further their reliance on 
Mr. Weaver's statement "but really we didn't need 
it because the beams were structurally sound." (TR 
20) 
The other arguments in counsel for appellant's 
point IV of his brief are either not factual or have 
no bearing on the question of reliance of fitness for 
use, and we submit that the trial court held correctly 
on this point. 
POINT V 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS FIND-
ING THAT THE BEAMS WERE NOT AS 
12 
STRUCTURALLY SOUND AND STRONG AR 
THEY APPEARED AND SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN, IF PROPERLY MANUFACTURED, AND 
THAT THE BUILDING COLLAPSED BY REA-
SON OF THE STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN 
THEIR MANUFACTURE. 
Mr. Joseph F. Patrick, Sr., a structural engi 
neer and an expert witness testifying in this case, 
and being specifically familiar with the processes 
for the manufacture of and use of laminated wood 
products (TR 52) , testified as follows; (TR 54, 55): 
Q. "Assuming wood beams containing 
eight laminations were installed over a span 
of twenty-four feet with four-foot over-hangs 
on either end, and assuming further that these ' 
beams were properly constructed and were 
positioned on eight-foot centers in Kamas, 
Utah, do you have an opinion as to whether ! 
or not those beams would be structurally ' 
sound to contain the roof?" 
A. "Yes, I have an opinion, it would re· I 
quire some qualification." 
' , I 
A. "The process of laminating beams is 
both simple and complicated. There are many ! 
factors that influence the strength of any 
given beam, and of course on just the visn~I ' 
inspection it is very difficult to ascertm11 . 
whether all of these particular elements hm't , 
been met, and these are the qualifications." 
"Now, as to the specific beams and some 
of the specific reasons why I feel that the 
beams themselves will not or would not ac: 
complish what they were purported to 1111 
to do" ... 
13 
The court: "Well, I don't know what they 
were reported to you to do, but he's asked 
you whether or not they are sound, and I sup-
pose he means sufficiently strong to withhold 
the normal snows that would fall at the place 
where this house was." 
A. "And on the basis of that particular 
statement, your honor, I would say that there 
are several areas where these beams fail to 
meet the standards of construction of the in-
dustry." 
Q. "Mr. Patrick, before we get into that, 
let me restate my question to you. If you 
were to assume that these beams met the 
standards of industry, would they have been 
adequate to do the job? 
A. "Provided the proper stress grades of 
lumber had been used, yes, Sir." 
Then again after cross examination and after 
the testimony of the engineer, Mr. Wadsworth, Mr. 
Patrick testified again as follows (TR 142): 
Q. "All right, now, in view of the defi-
nition which he's given and the testimony of 
Mr. Wadsworth concerning failure, may I ask 
whether or not this beam if properly con-
structed would have contained the load with-
out collapse?" 
A. "In my opinion, if a beam of these 
dimensions properly laminated, installed at 
eight feet, had been subjected to a load in ~he 
neighborhood of forty, forty to forty-five 
14 
pounds, it very likely would not have col. 
lapsed. It would not have had the normal fac-
tor of safety." (See also TR 75 on this point). 
Now both engineers testified that the beam~ i 
were defectively manufactured, there is no question '. 
about that, and the roof actually collapsed. So wheth- 1 
er the roof would have collapsed anyway if properly 
manufactured, Mr. Patrick, the expert, thinks not, 
but for counsel for appellant to categorically state 
so, is ridiculous, and it is purely a matter of con-
jecture. 
The judge felt there was ample evidence to sup- . 
port this finding as stated in his ruling in the lower ' 
court (TR 208) : 
"Now, it may be that there should have 
been four-foot centers instead of eight-foot 
centers, but it wasn't an eight-foot center that : 
caused this beam, this roof to give way. The · 
thing that caused this roof to give way is the 
defect in the beam itself." 
POINT VI 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING f 
THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT KNOW OR HAVE ' 
REASON TO KNOW THAT THE BEAMS PUR· ,
1
· 
CHASED FROM DEFENDANT WERE OF INE'., 
FERIOR QUALITY OR THAT THEY WER i 
STRUCTURALLY DEFECTIVE, AND THE : 
COURT DID NOT ERR AS TO THE QUESTIO~ ! 
OF WAIVER OF PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT TO · 
CLAIM BREACH OF WARRANTY, CONTRIBU· j 
TORY NEGLIGENCE, AND ASSUMPTION OF . 
RISK. 
15 
We have set out a partial argument on the ques-
tion of knowledge on the part of plaintiff as to the 
defectiveness and structural soundness of the beams 
in our Point IV, which we refer the court to. Counsel 
for appellant states in his Point IV ( 7), "Weaver 
told them to put the beams on four-foot centers (TR 
151)". Mr. Weaver testified actually that a month 
or so after respondent opened for business, a casual 
observation was made on the subject (TR 150, 151). 
Again in his Point IV ( 8) counsel states, "Ban-
nister told them the beams would not hold as placed 
... " (TR 171). Here again, it was after the beams 
were placed that the purported conversation took 
place and his statement was a passing comment only, 
but nowhere did he say that the beams would not 
hold as placed. He actually testified to the contrary 
-that he made no such statement. These statements 
and others made by Mr. Thacker were denied by 
respondent, and anyway they have nothing to do 
with knowledge of defective beams on the part of 
respondent. 
At the time of delivery of the beams, there was 
no knowledge of structural defects or unsoundness 
of the beams, (TR 20, 21, 119), but respondent did 
complain about their appearance. The testimony of 
Mrs. Leishman and Mr. Dell was corroborated by Mr. 
Weaver of appellant's company on this point (TR 
148, 149) : 
A. "Shortly after the beams were de-
livered, Mr. Dell had come down and com-
plained about appearance ... " 
A. "The objection he raised to the beams 
were some voids, there was ... " 
16 
Q. "Some voids?" 
A. "By voids I mean slight openings such 
as this in the finger join ts." · 
Q. "You mean the openings ... you have 
pointed to the areas where we have heard tes-
timony that there is improper lamination. Is 
that what you mean by the voids?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "He had some objection to that?" 
A. "From appearance standpoint." 
Q. "And what else was said?" 
A. "There was some mud on the beams 
because there was snow and mud on the 
ground, and they were dumped there, un· 
loaded. I suggested that he possibly could fill 
those voids with some kind of plastic or wood 
because we were speaking merely from the 
standpoint of appearance now." 
Again, merely because Mr. Weaver or Mr. Car· 
roll suggested putting in bolts in the beams if there 
was any concern about them, but assured respondent, 
"but really we didn't need it because the beams were · 
structurally sound (TR 20), did not impart knowl· i 
edge to respondent of structural unsoundness a~o , 
defects. (See also TR 57). It would take an expert ID 
the field to determine such structural unsoundness, , 
17 
as was evidenced by the testimony of both the expert 
engineer witnesses. 
Mr. Wads worth had to look twice, closely before 
he could say the joint was not a good one (TR 136, 
137). Then, after viewing carefully one of the de-
laminated beams, and in response to the question 
"Does that delamination indicate improper or weak 
bonding of glue?", Mr. Wadsworth answered, "not 
necessarily, in my opinion." (TR 137). 
Again Mr. Wadsworth was asked (TR 139): 
Q. "But the mere fact that there is spac-
ing at the butt end of the finger joint, is that 
an indication of weakness within the joint 
itself?" 
A. "No. It is the width of it that would 
indicate it." 
Mr. Patrick testified, as we have already argued 
in our Point V: "There are many factors that in-
fluence the strength of any given beam, and of 
course, on just the visual inspection it is very diffi-
cult to ascertain whether all of these particular ele-
ments have been met ... " 
Thus, the court properly found that plaintiff 
had no knowledge that the beams purchased were 
structurally defective. The judge, in his ruling on 
this, pointed out as follows (TR 208): 
"I believe these plaintiffs would no more 
have put a defective beam up there than they 
would have flown because they knew that the 
thing they had bought for some $7500.00 had 
been knocked down by snow, and they wanted 
good beams." 
18 
Now in regard to appellant's argument as tri 
waiver, contributory negligence, and assumption of 
risk set out in his Point IX, we submit that when, 
there is no show~ng by appellant of knowledge u/ 
structural defectiveness of the beams on the part 
of respondent, such theory and argument must im-
mediately fail, even if the theory were sound, which 
it is not. 
The cases and authorities cited by appellant are 
either not in point or involve only those situations 
where the buyer must have actual knowledge of 
the defect, continue to use the goods and additional 
damages result from such use. And it is further 
noted that even in those cases that may involve these 
elements, where the continued use has been at the 
suggestion or instigation of the seller, the courts 
still allow recovery to the buyer for his damages 
(See 33 ALR 2nd 513, 517). 
Therefore we feel the trial court was fully justi- 1. 
fied in not finding for appellant on these points. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING ' 
THAT PLAINTIFF MADE NO COMPROMIS~ ! 
WITH DEFENDANT ON PRICE REDUCTIO~ I 
BY REASON OF STRUCTURAL DEFECTS INR
1 
1 
THE BEAMS, AND THE COURT DID NOT ER 
IN NOT GRANTING A NEW TRIAL OR TO SNEGT 
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AFTER HEARI 
ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY ON THE EV
0
Nl· 
DENCE GIVEN BY W. WARD BLAZZARD 
THE QUESTION OF PRICE REDUCTION. 
19 
Counsel for appellant states in his brief at point 
VIII that Mrs. Leishman admitted the rebate was 
given because of structural defects. This simply is 
not the fact. Mrs. Leishman's testimony was to the 
effect that the structural defects of the beams did 
1wt have anything to do with the discount. She testi-
fied as follows (TR 119) : 
A. "The discount was given later, yes." 
Q. "And that was because of all the fac-
tors, one including the structural aspects of 
the beams. Isn't that true?" 
A. "No, Sir." 
Again, we refer the court to our argument in 
Point IV of this brief on this question, where it 
· is clear, both from Mr. Dell's testimony and Mr. 
Weaver's testimony that the reduction in price was 
by reason of someone else having bought the beams 
' for less money (TR 39, 152). It was Mr. Weaver of 
appellant company who respondent was dealing with, 
' not Mr. Blazzard, and so appellant is bound by Mr. 
Weayer's own testimony on this point, which is 
' very clear. 
Just how the credit memorandum in the hands 
of Mr. Blazzard received the notation "adjustment 
0f price due to dissatisfaction in laminating" got 
there, when it was not entered on the copy given to 
respondent, and whether or not the judge believed 
Mr. Blazzard's explanation of putting the notation 
there himself (it was not entered there by Mr. Weav-
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er, who had the conversation as to price adjustment 
with respondent), makes no difference in this case. 
Further, we do not believe nor recollect the 
judge stating that he would be obligated to dismiss 
plaintiff's action, if what Mr. Blazzard said was in 
fact true. It appears nowhere in the record, and 
even if the statement were made, it would have no 
bearing on this case. 
The trial judge, by his further order, merely 
found that he believed Mr. Blazard had not tried d~­
liberately to pull a fast one on the court. This does 
not mean that the trial judge had to throw out the 
testimony of Mrs. Leishman, Mr. Dell, and Mr. 
Weaver, as to the reason for the price reduction. 
Again, there was ample evidence to support the 
court's finding on the reason for the reduction in 
price on the beams, and that it was not by reason 
of any structural defects. 
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POINT VIII 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING 
RESPONDENT SUFFERED DAMAGES IN THE 
AMOUNT OF $7,500.00. 
As stated in 22 Am. J ur. 2nd, 190, Sec. 132: 
"The goal of the damage remedy in cases 
involving injury to a person's interest in real 
property is that of compensation. One whose 
interest in realty has been injured by the tor-
tious act or omission of another is entitled to 
those damages which will compensate him 
for the injury sustained. Generally this prin-
ciple is translated into the following two 
rules of damages : ( 1) the injured party is 
entitled to recover the difference between the 
value of the real property immediately before 
and immediately after the injury (often re-
ferred to as the 'diminution in value' rule) ; 
( 2) the injured party is entitled to recover 
the cost of repairing the realty by restoring it 
to its condition immediately prior to the in-
jury (generally ref erred to as the 'restora-
tion' or 'cost or repair' rule)." 
Appellant's counsel cites in his brief the diminu-
tion in value rule, as the applicable rule. In the foot-
notes of the cases referred to under appellants cita-
tion in 22 Am. Jur. 2nd, 194, Sec. 134, the case of 
Curtis v. Fruin-Colnon Contracting Company, 363 
Mo. 676; 253 SW 2nd 158 is cited to the effect that 
the "Restoration or cost of repair" rule may be ap-
P.licable in these type cases where the cost of restora-
tion is less than the diminution in value and the 
realty can be repaired. The trial court considered 
this in hearing testimony on the damages (TR 97). 
22 
Consequently there was not only evidence in the 
record under the "diminution of value" rule, which 
am~unted to $17,500.00 ~amages, but also expert 
testimony on the "restoration or cost of repair" rule. 
Mr. Robert Gray testified as a general contrac-
tor that he had made a study of the collapsed Samak 
Lodge and had carefully calculated his figures in 
the cost of reconstructing and restoring the prem-
ises. His estimate of cost for the various items to do 
the job was testified to in detail with a cost of restor-
ing the premises as it was just prior to the collapse 
of the roof structure of $11,506.35 (TR 98, 99, 100). 
Now Mrs. Leishman who was the owner, build-
er, and operator of the Samak Lodge property and 
who had developed a going business there, as well 
as had offers of purchase on the property after the 
business was a going concern (TR 104, 105) was a 
qualified witness to testify of the property value just 
prior to the collapse of the building as well as its · 
value after the collapse and thus the testimony of 
these values of $25,000.00 before the collapse and i 
$7,500.00 after the destruction is in the record as 
competent evidence (See 20 Am. Jur. 751, Sec. 892). 
1 
Furthermore Mrs. Leishman's testimony was 
uncontradicted. Appellant's attorney offered no evi· 
dence whatsoever on the question of value of the 1 
property nor on the cost of restoring the same, and 
the trial judge was fully justified to weigh both Mr. 
Gray's testimony and Mrs. Leishman's testimony~ 
to these damages. (See 20 Am. Jur., 1030-103 .. , 
Sec. 1180) 
Thus the court was in a position in this. c~se ' 
to adopt the lesser of the two amounts, the dunin· 
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ished value or the cost of restoring, as the measure 
of damages. 
In 22 Am. Jur. 2nd, 204-205, Sec. 140 it states: 
"It has also been held that the owner is 
entitled to recover the entire cost of restoring 
a damaged building to its former condition, 
unless such cost exceeds its diminution in 
value as the result of the injury, in which 
event the recovery must be limited to the 
amount of such diminution. Under this rule 
the court should receive evidence both as to 
the cost of restoring the building and as to 
the amount of its diminished value, and then 
adopt as the measure of damages the lesser of 
the two amounts." 
Counsel for appellant cites the case of Gilmore 
v. Cohen, 386 P. 2nd 81 (Ariz.) for the proposition 
that only nominal damages should be allowed. The 
facts in that case showed no apparent actual dam-
age, while in the case at bar, there was actual dam-
age apparent from the fact that the roof collapsed, 
and it was only a question of how much damage. 
Mrs. Leishman had spent in cash over $6500.00 and 
with some donated labor to restore the building and 
rnof structure before (TR 104, 110), and Mr. Gray 
testified that it would cost $11,506.35 to restore the 
Lodge, so there was no question about the fact of 
damage being proven. The court in the Gilmore case 
stated: 
"It is firmly established, of course, in 
this state as elsewhere, that certainty in 
omount of damages is not essential to recov-
ery when the fact of damage is proven . . . 
'rhis is simply a recognition that doubts as to 
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the extent o~ the injury _sh~uld be resolved lll 
favor of the mnocent plamtiff and against the 
wrongdoer." 
We submit that the court in the Gilmore case 
supports respondents position on damages. 
It should also be pointed out that the trial judge 
made a special, personal trip to view for himself the 
damaged Samak Lodge to consider the extent of 
damage and salvage material (TR 192, 208). Conse-
quently, from the evidence received and from the 
personal inspection by the judge, the court made a 
proper finding as to damages in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from an examination of the facts 
and evidence in this case that the trial court properly 
found in favor of Respondent, and the judgment of 
the lower court should be affirmed and the Respond-
ents awarded their costs herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SP AFFORD & YOUNG 
2188 Highland Drive, 
Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 ! 
Attorneys for Respondent 
